Different search engines conduct similar ad auctions simultaneously and advertisers have to choose in which search engine(s) to run their ad campaign. In this paper we discuss two models for a pair of simultaneous ad auctions, A and B: (i) singlecampaign advertisers, which participate in a single ad auction, and (ii) multi-campaign advertisers, which participate in both auctions. We prove the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric equilibrium in the first model. Moreover, when the click-through rates in A are point-wise higher than those in B, we prove that the expected revenue in A is greater than the expected revenue in B in this equilibrium. In contrast, we show that higher click-rates do not necessarily imply higher revenues in the second model.
Introduction
Search engines and publishers conduct ad auctions for potentially every keyword. In an ad auction, advertisers compete over positions in the web page associated with the results of searching for the corresponding keyword. The advertisers submit bids, and the position of displayed ads on the web page is determined based on these bids. Moreover, an advertiser pays the search engine each time a user clicks on her ad where the charged price is also based Email addresses: iashlagi@hbs.edu, dov@ie.technion.ac.il, moshet@ie.technion.ac.il on the submitted bids. Due to their enormous impact on the revenues of publishers/search engines and advertisers and because of the important challenges they provide for auction designers and participants, ad auctions have become a central topic of study in economics, electronic commerce, and marketing.
1 However, the previous research has yet to account for the fact that similar ad auctions are held simultaneously by different search engines. That is, an advertiser has to choose not only how to bid, but where to bid. This paper initiates research on this question by examining two simultaneous ad auctions. We present two models. The first considers single-campaign advertisers, who choose a single search engine to run their campaign. In this case, the game has two stages. In the first stage each advertiser, after observing her type, chooses her probability for selecting each auction. We refer to this probability as the advertiser's participation strategy. After the realization of the participation strategy, the advertiser chooses her bid. No information is revealed after the first stage, and therefore, for technical convenience, the game can be viewed as having only one stage in which each advertiser chooses a participation strategy and two bids, one for each auction.
Implicitly this model assumes that an advertiser has an infinite cost to run ad campaigns in both auctions. In the second model, we consider multi-campaign advertisers. These advertisers run their campaign and bid in both auctions. 2 A main issue in both settings is the effect of having more than one ad auction on the revenue of the different auctions; of particular interest is the relationship between the click-rate values (search engines' popularity) and the corresponding ad auctions' revenue. Do higher click-rates result in higher revenue?
In addition, a full analysis of the first setting requires us to introduce equilibrium analysis 1 See, e.g., (Varian, 2007; Lahaie, 2006; Edelman et al., 2007; Borgs et al., 2007; Mehta et al., 2007; Athey and Ellison, 2007) . 2 Our models of simultaneous ad auctions are not the only reasonable ones. One very interesting model is to consider a market in which advertiser chooses if to be single-campaign or multi-campaign, for example by incorporating costs for running ad campaigns (note that our models implicitly assume specific extreme costs). One can also consider at least two other potential models. In the first model, which is similar in spirit to our single-campaign model, the assumption that every bidder participates only in one auction is kept. However, the number of participants in each auction is revealed to all advertisers after the selection part is over. In the second model, each bidder has a limited budget, and her strategic decision is how to split this budget among the auctions.
for simultaneous ad auctions, a subject not tackled for such rich setting thus far. Note that, in the first setting, advertisers choose a single auction to participate in. As mentioned, advertisers often do tend to concentrate on only one search engine in certain keyword markets.
One reason for this behavior is the burden that advertisers have in running and managing their campaigns in each search engine. Another reason arises from the lack of flexibility in copying advertising campaign data from some search engines to others (see e.g., (Edelman, 2008b) , and (Edelman, 2008a) ). We analyze simultaneous ad auctions with single-campaign advertisers within the standard symmetric independent private-value model. We prove our results for VCG ad auctions and explicitly extend them to regular ad auctions, where roughly speaking, a regular ad auction is one for which an appropriate revenue equivalence theorem makes it equivalent to a VCG ad auction. For VCG ad auctions, we assume that a bidder bids her true valuation, irrespective of the auction she selects. This assumption reduces the strategy set of every bidder to the set of participation strategies. We prove that the auction selection game has an essentially unique symmetric equilibrium, whose structure is analyzed. Particular cases are presented and discussed. Search engines use ad auctions as one of their main revenue sources. Intuitively, since an advertiser is charged each time a user clicks on her ad, one would expect that higher click rates will result in higher revenues. This implies that search firms should care about providing effective search engines, yielding high traffic to their sites. Indeed, in a setting with simultaneous ad auctions and single-campaign advertisers, we prove that when Auction A is stronger than Auction B, in the sense that the click rates in A are point-wise higher than those in B, the expected revenue of A is higher than the expected revenue of B in the essentially unique equilibrium. However, we show that this seemingly intuitive result is a consequence of the competition on the auction to be selected. For multi-campaign advertisers, in which advertisers participate in both auctions, we compare revenues in two monopolistic setups, where one of them has higher click-rates than the other. In this setting, we characterize cases in which a stronger auction may yield lower revenue than a weaker one.
3 We prove our results for a not necessarily symmetric model, and without any restriction on the distribution of types. Since the revenue equivalence principle is less useful for such general models, the theorems are proved only for VCG ad auctions.
Nevertheless, the theorems are applied to next-price ad auctions 4 which are used in practice.
This application builds on the pioneering papers of Varian (2007) and Edelman et al. (2007) ,
where the relationships between next-price ad auctions and VCG ad auctions are explored using theoretical and empirical tools.
In the last section we extend our results and conclusions to ad auctions with reserve prices. Our existence and uniqueness results in this setting generalize those in Burguet and Sakovics (1999) , where the authors defined and analyzed a setting among two simultaneous identical second-price single item auctions with potentially distinct reserve prices. Our work could have had some implications for (or impact on) the Google-Yahoo Ad Deal, discussed by the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary Task Force on Competition
Policy and Antitrust Laws in 2008 (see e.g., (Edelman, 2008a) ) and by the European Commission (Cheng, 2008) . Our results support the claim that this deal would harm advertisers and internet users in two ways. First, in the monopolistic setup, a search engine can, in certain circumstances, increase its revenue by decreasing click rates, which implies reducing quality of service to internet users. Second, the equilibrium structure we establish supports the claim that, when advertisers have the ability to select among alternatives auctions, those with low valuations participate in the auction with lower click rates. It is important to note that our paper does not discuss strategic organizers' competition in auction design, although it opens the road for such a model. In general, such a competition is modeled as a two stage game, where, in the first stage every auction organizer chooses the auction to conduct, and in the second stage each of the bidders decides which auction to attend and how to bid in this auction. Such an approach was taken in a restricted symmetric single-item auction setup, e.g., in (Burguet and Sakovics, 1999) and in (Monderer and Tennenholtz, 2004) . However, as was already shown in (McAfee, 1993 ) the above two-stage game does not in general possess a sub-game perfect equilibrium, even in the simple single-item setup. 5 Therefore, most of the literature ((McAfee, 1993; Peters, 1997; Peters and Severinov, 1997) ) on competition in auction design in the single-item setup has dealt with a model with many auctions and derived results about the limit (partially strategic) behavior of the market, when the number of auctions' organizers and buyers is approaching infinity. This approach does not seem the right one in the ad auction market, where only a few auctions' organizers (search engines) control the market.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we define the basic model of ad auctions.
In Section 3 we define the model of single-campaign advertisers' competition in simultaneous ad auctions, and present our main results for the VCG setup: a theorem about existence and essential uniqueness of symmetric equilibrium, and a theorem about revenue dominance of the strong auction. The existence and uniqueness theorem is proved in Section 4, and examples are provided in Section 4.5. The theorem about revenue inequality is proved in Section 5. In Section 6 we define regular ad auctions and prove that our main theorems hold for them. Section 8 deals with multi-campaign advertisers, which participate in both auctions. We show that in a monopolistic setup, higher click-rates do not necessarily imply higher revenues. In Section 7 we extend our results to a setup with reserve prices.
Ad Auctions
There exist n advertisers, which we call bidders, n ≥ 2; A generic bidder is denoted by i,
In an ad auction there is a seller who offers for sale k positions, k ≥ 1; a generic position is denoted by j, 1 ≤ j ≤ k. As the seller cannot sell more positions than the number of bidders, it is assumed that n ≥ k. The positions are sold for a fixed period of time. For each position j there is a commonly-known number α j > 0, which is interpreted as the expected number of visitors at that position; α j is called the click rate of position j. It is assumed that the positions have distinct click rates, and without loss of generality it is assumed that α 1 > α 2 > . . . > α k > 0. For convenience, we add a dummy position, position k + 1 with α k+1 = 0. From now on, unless otherwise specified, the term"position"
includes the dummy position. Let K = {1, . . . , k} be the set of non-dummy positions, and let K d = K ∪ {k + 1} denote the set of positions.
Given the above environment, an ad auction is defined by an allocation rule and a payment scheme. Each bidder i is requested to submit a bid b i ∈ B i = [0, 1]. The set of bid profiles is denoted by B = B 1 × · · · × B n . Based on the profile of bids, the allocation rule determines the allocation of positions to the bidders. However, in this paper we consider only ad auctions for which the allocation rule is a welfare maximizer; that is, whenever bids are distinct, the bidder with the highest bid receives the first position, the second highest bidder receives the second position etc. Each bidder that does not receive a position j ∈ K is assigned to the dummy position, k + 1. Distinct welfare maximizers allocation rules differ in the tie-breaking rule they use. In this paper tie problems will be successfully avoided.
However, for completeness, it is assumed that ties are resolved by the following simple priority rule over bidders: i < t implies that i has priority over t, whenever they make the same bid. 6 Hence, with this tie breaking rule there exists a unique allocation rule, which is a welfare maximizer. We denote by s i (b) bidder i's position with respect to the welfare maximizer allocation rule when the bid profile is
A payment scheme is a tuple p = (p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n ), where for every i p i : B → R + is a non- his utility is α j (v i − p).
We use the independent-private-value model to model the distribution of valuations; that is, each v i is privately observed by i, and it is drawn from the interval V i = [0, 1] according to a random variableṽ i , whose distribution function is F i ; The random variables,ṽ i are independent. At this point, and unless otherwise specified F i is not required to satisfy particular assumptions except for being a distribution function. That is, F i is a non-decreasing and right-continuous function on [0, 1] , and F i (1) = 1.
LetF denote the joint distribution of the bidders on V = V 1 × V 2 · · · × V n . Throughout this paper we use the standard notation regarding the subscript −i. E.g.,F −i denotes the joint distribution of all bidders except i. The Bayesian game generated by the ad auction G(k, α, p) and by the vector of distribution functions
With a slight abuse of notation G(k, α, p, F) is also called an ad auction. Let 
) be the expected utility of bidder i given that her valuation is v i and every bidder t uses the strategy d t . That is,
We are about to discuss special ad auctions. Before we do it, we need the following definition.
For every vector of real numbers, x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) we denote by (x (1) , x (2) , . . . , x (n) ) a permutation of the vector x for which x (1) ≥ x (2) ≥ · · · ≥ x (n) . For a bid profile, b, whenever convenient, we let b (j) = 0 for every j > n.
The leading search engines use variants of the next-price ad auctions: Definition 2.1 (Next-price ad auction) The ad auction G = G(k, α, p) is called the next-price ad auction if its payment scheme p is defined for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n as follows:
(1)
In this paper we mainly deal with the standard VCG ad auction.
Definition 2.2 (Standard VCG ad auction) The ad auction G = G(k, α, p) is called the standard VCG ad auction, or in short, the VCG ad auction, if its payment scheme p is defined for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n as follows:
In a non-standard VCG ad auction, every bidder may pay an additional amount depending only on the bids of the other bidders.
3 Simultaneous Ad Auctions with Single-Campaign Ad-
vertisers -Main Results

Consider two ad auctions,
, and recall the assump-
In what follows, whenever necessary, it is assumed that α j = 0 for every j > k A and that β j = 0 for every j > k B . Auctions A and B form a game for the bidders 1, 2, . . . , n, denoted by H(A, B, F), where F is the vector of distribution functions.
In this game each bidder simultaneously chooses one auction to participate in, and how to bid at each auction. Bidders can use mixed strategies to select an auction. We assume that a bidder can not attend both auctions. This assumption captures single-campaign advertisers, who run their campaign with only a single search engine. As mentioned, single-campaign advertisement is popular in many keyword markets. Since bidders can always guarantee a non-negative utility by bidding zero there is no harm in assuming that bidders always choose to participate in some auction. A strategy for a bidder i in H(A, B, F) is a tuple
where
) is the participation strategy of i, and
) is the bidding strategy of i.
7 More precisely, q
Borel measurable function, is the probability 7 Note that a bidder's strategy includes her bid in an auction even if the probability of attending this auction is zero. This is consistent with the usual redundancy in the definition of strategies in game theory.
is the bidding strategy in auction L ∈ {A, B}, which is also assumed to be measurable.
Let Σ i be the set of strategies for bidder i. Denote by U H(A,B,F) i (v i , σ 1 , . . . , σ n ) the expected utility for bidder i given that her valuation is v i and every bidder t uses the strategy σ t . A strategy profile σ = (σ 1 , . . . , σ n ) ∈ Σ 1 × · · · × Σ n is a Bayesian equilibrium in the game H(A, B, F) if for every bidder i and every v i ,
When dealing with the above setting, we derive our results for a symmetric model.
That is, the distribution functions of all bidders are identical. If the common distribution function is F , the ad auction
, F )) is denoted by H(A, B, F ). In a symmetric model it is natural
to focus on symmetric strategies/equilibrium, and therefore we omit the bidder's index from strategies. Hence, we refer to a strategy of a bidder as a vector (
Let (q,d) be a symmetric equilibrium strategy. Note that changing the participation function q in a set of valuations v with F −probability 0 for which 0 < q A (v) < 1, does not change the utilities of any of the bidders. This inspires the following definition:
VCG ad auctions, and let F be a distribution function. The game H(A, B, F ) possesses an essentially unique symmetric equilibrium if it possesses a symmetric equilibrium and for every two symmetric equilibria q,q
Moreover, we will frequently assume that F is standard, where 
We prove our main results for VCG ad auctions. In such case we naturally assume that the bidding strategy of each bidder is the truth-telling strategy. Hence, a strategy of a bidder in such case is determined by his participation strategy.
We prove:
be VCG ad auctions and let F be a standard distribution function.
The game H(A, B, F ) possesses an essentially unique symmetric equilibrium.
Moreover, If α 1 ≥ β 1 there exists a unique 0 ≤ v * ≤ 1 for which there exists a symmetric equilibrium, q = (q A , q B ) with the following properties:
Furthermore, v * = 0 if and only if α n ≥ β 1 , and v * = 1 if and only if α 1 = β 1 .
The condition α 1 ≥ β 1 in Theorem (3.3) is without loss of generality; Otherwise exchange the names of the auctions.
In Section 4 we prove Theorem 3.3, and we provide tools for computing the cutting point v * and the values of the probabilities below v * . In Section 4.5 we apply the tools developed in the proof in order to explicitly find and discuss the equilibrium in special cases.
Before we state our main theorem regarding revenues we need the following definition:
at least one inequality is strict.
be VCG ad auctions, and let F be a standard distribution function. If A is stronger than B, the expected revenue in A is greater than the expected revenue in B in the essentially unique symmetric equilibrium of the game H(A, B, F ).
Theorem 3.5 is proved in Section 5.
Proof of Theorem 3.3
Consider the game H(A, B, F ), where A and B are VCG auctions, and F is a standard distribution function, whose density is denoted by f . Without loss of generality assume that
If α n ≥ β 1 then in particular α n > 0 and therefore n = k A . In such case, for an arbitrary bidder i, independently of all other bidders' strategies, the maximal utility in B, β 1 v i does not exceed his minimal utility in A, α n v i , and we say that the competition is degenerate. We cover this trivial case in some more detail in Section 4.4. In the following proof of Theorem 3.3 we assume non-degenerate competition. That is, α n < β 1 .
Preparations
Let q be a symmetric strategy. For an arbitrary bidder i let
That is,
When all other bidders but t use the strategy q, bidder t should compare his utilities in A and in B. When he computes his utility in A, he faces a random number of participants.
Equivalently, bidder t can consider lack of participation in A as participation in A of a bidder with valuation 0. Hence, bidder i can assume that there exist exactly additional n−1 bidders in A such that the distribution function of each of them is F A q , where
Similarly, for auction B, let ψ(v, q) =
, and therefore
Denote by P A (v, q) (P B (v, q)) the expected total payment in A (B) experienced by a bidder with valuation v given that each of the other bidders uses the strategy q. Similarly, v, q) ) the expected click rate in A (B), and denote by
Note that a bidder with valuation v obtains position j in auction A if there are exactly n − j other bidders each of whom has a lower valuation than v in A and there are exactly j − 1 bidders each of whom has a higher valuation than v in A. Since ties have probability zero, the probability that the bidder obtains j and the above condition is not satisfied equals 0. Therefore,
Similarly,
We need the following proposition whose proof is standard in mechanism design theory.
Proposition 4.1 For every L ∈ {A, B} and every symmetric strategy q:
is non-decreasing and continuous in [0, 1].
For every symmetric strategy q and for every
v ∈ [0, 1] U L (v, q) = v 0 Q L (x, q)dx. (10) Consequently, since Q L is continuous, the derivative of U L (·, q) equals Q L (·, q) everywhere in [0, 1].
Proof:
We prove the proposition for L = A. 1. Let v, w ∈ [0, 1]. Because truthtelling is a dominant strategy for a bidder, bidding v when his valuation equals v yields at least as bidding w, that is, vQ
. Combining these inequalities yields 
. Therefore, by the two inequalities we derived in part 1 of this proof, and by (7),
By (Rockafellar, 1970) this easily implies that U A (·, q) is a convex function, whose derivative equals Q A almost everywhere in [0, 1], and since U A (0, q) = 0, the required integral equality follows.
The following functions are extensively used in our proofs. For every 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 and
and let
Note that by (8), (9), (5), and (6), for every 0 ≤ v ≤ 1,
and therefore
For a function φ(x, y) we denote by φ x , φ y the derivatives with respect to the first and second variable respectively. Similarly, if φ(x) is a function of one variable, φ x denotes the derivative of φ. The following technical lemma will be useful for us.
x (x, y) > 0 for every x, y for which 0 < x + y < 1.
x (x) < 0 for every 0 < x < 1. Consequently, (iv) Q x (x, y) > 0 for every x, y for which 0 < x+F (y) < 1 or [x+F (y) = 1 and 0 < x, y < 1].
(v) Q y (x, y) > 0 for every x, y for which 0 < x + F (y) < 1.
The equality (i) is obvious. (ii) Recall the standard convention that for nonnegative integers a < b,
where the last equality follows since
(n−1) and
Assume 0 < x + y < 1, which implies, in particular, that both summands in RHS(17) are nonnegative. If n > k A , the first summand in RHS (17) is positive. If n = k A , k A ≥ 2, and
Therefore, RHS(17) > 0, which completes the proof of (ii). Note thatQ
whereQ is defined asQ A , except that we replace α j with β j for every relevant j and k A with k B . Therefore, (iii) follows from (ii).
Before we present our next proposition we present a variant of the Implicit Function Theorem needed in its proof:
Theorem 4.3 (Implicit Function Theorem) Let F : E × J → R be a continuously differentiable function, where E and J are open intervals. and let (x 0 , y 0 ) ∈ E ×J be a point for which F (x 0 , y 0 ) = 0 and F x (x 0 , y 0 ) = 0. Then, there exists an open interval I = (y 0 −δ, y 0 +δ), δ > 0, and a unique function g : I → J such that g(y 0 ) = x 0 and F (g(y), y) = 0 for all y ∈ I. Moreover g is continuously differentiable on I and for every y ∈ I 
Moreover, this unique function denoted by h satisfies 0 < h(v) < 1 − F (v) for every
3. h is continuously differentiable and 0 < − 
which completes the proof of this part. 
Therefore, by what we proved in the previous part of this theorem, g(y) = h(y) for every y in this smaller neighborhood of v. This implies that h is continuously differentiable in this smaller neighborhood of v, and in particular it is differentiable in v. By the Implicit Function Theorem,
By parts (iv) and (v) of Lemma 4.2, −h (v) > 0. It remains to prove that −
That is, we have to prove that
Note that
by part (iii) of Lemma 4.2. Hence, (19) holds.
We end this subsection with the following useful lemma:
2. For every v ∈ (v *
3. For every v > v * and for every strategy q,
Proof:
Existence
We defineq = (q A ,q B ) by definingq B as follows: The values,q B (0),q B (v * ) are left unspecified, and for other 0 < v ≤ 1q
In order to prove thatq is a symmetric equilibrium it suffices to prove the following two claims:
We first compute the function ϕ(v,q).
0. We will show that:
Indeed, if v = v * the proof is obvious since ϕ(v 
, and since by part 4 in
which proves (a). By Lemma 4.5, 
Uniqueness
Let q be a symmetric equilibrium. We first prove that:
Establishing (22) In order to prove (22) we need the following technical lemma, the proof of which is standard and hence omitted. Lemma 4.7 Let 0 ≤ c < d ≤ 1 be two valuations for which U A (c, q) − U B (c, q) = 0 and
. By Lemma 4.6 it suffices to prove that there exists 
Recall that by Lemma 4.1,
. Hence we have:
However, since q
Therefore there exists c < z < d for which φ(z) = 0. This completes the proof.
Recall that U
By continuity ,U A (d, q)−U B (d, q) = 0, and by Lemma 4.7, U A (v, q)−U B (v, q) = 0 for every
, contradicting our negative assumption. Hence, in order to establish (22), it suffices to prove that d = v * . Before we do it, note that since
0 almost every where in this interval. Hence,
However, since Q A , Q B are continuous, the equality holds everywhere, that is
Assume in negation that v
))dz < 0 contradicting. This completes the proof of uniqueness.
Degenerate competition
Recall that the competition is degenerate when α n ≥ β 1 and that in such case n = k A .
In this case it can be easily seen that the strategy profile in which every bidder chooses A with probability 1 is in equilibrium. Indeed, If bidder i with valuation v i deviates to B he receives a utility of β 1 v i , while if he stays in A, his minimal utility equals α n v i . Therefore, the existence assertion follows by letting v * = 0. Regarding essential uniqueness, if q = (q
is a symmetric equilibrium and that ϕ(0, q) > 0, there exists 0 < c < 1 such that q 
Examples for Special Cases
Example 1 (k A = k B = 2) First we consider two ad auctions, each with two positions, that is, k A = k B = 2. In addition it is assumed that α 1 > β 1 > α 2 . When n = 2 the structure of equilibrium is revealed analytically.
By (12) and (13)
Recall that Q(x, y) =Q A (x, F (y))−Q B (x), and that v * is the unique solution of Q(0, v * ) = 1.
, the essentially unique equilibriumq satisfies:
Hence, bidders with high valuations participate with probability 1 in auction A, while a bidder with a low valuation randomizes and assigns a constant probability to each of the auctions at the interval (0, v * ). Note that if α 1 − α 2 > β 1 − β 2 ,
, that is, a bidder with a low valuation assigns a higher probability to the weaker auction. 5 Proof of Theorem 3.5
be VCG ad auctions such that A is stronger than B, and let F be a standard distribution function. Let R A (R B ) be the expected revenue in auction A (B) at the essentially unique symmetric equilibrium,q in H(A, B, F ). We have to prove that
In the rest of the proofq is fixed and therefore omitted from the description of the functions. By the proof of Theorem 3.3 and by (7), P A (v) = P B (v) for every v ∈ [0, v * ], and because, in addition,q
for such v, and therefore
dx, the second term in the right-hand-side of the last equality is a double integral. By changing the order of the integrals in this second term, and move to the parameter x, we get
We are about to apply the method of integration by parts to the right-hand-side of (28). For
Let G(x) = x 0 g(t)dt. We claim that the derivative Q A x (x) exists at each of the intervals (0, v * ) and (v * , 1) and it is bounded at each of these intervals, and that G(1) = 0. Therefore, by integration by parts
Indeed, for 0
. It remains to show that G(1) = 0. Indeed, it is easily verified that G(x) = xF (x) + 2xϕ(x) − x for every 0 ≤ x ≤ 1. Hence, G(1) = 0. Since by what we showed above Q A x (x) > 0 except at most three values of x, in order to prove that ∆ < 0 it suffices to prove that G(x) = xF (x) + 2xϕ(x) − x < 0 for every 0 < x < 1.
For every v * ≤ x < 1, G(x) = xF (x) − x < 0. So, it remains to prove (31) for 0 < x < v * .
In order to prove it we use the fact that A is stronger than B. By re-arranging the terms in (31), we have to prove that
Let x ∈ (0, v * ) and leth(x) =
and 1 −h(x) −
. Therefore, by (12) and (13)
andQ
32) follows.
Regular Ad Auctions
Consider two ad auctions 
Let D = G(k, α, p) be an ad auction, and let F be a standard distribution function. For every q let D(q) = G(k, α, p, F q ) be the ad auction with F q . We say that D is a regular ad auction if for every standard distribution function F and for every participation function, q, D(q) possesses a symmetric equilibrium in which every bidder uses a bidding strategy, which is non-decreasing and equals an increasing function almost everywhere with respect to F q .
That is, there exists an increasing strategy in [0, 1] which equals the equilibrium strategy almost everywhere with respect to F q . In particular, if F q is constant at a certain interval, the symmetric equilibrium is not necessarily increasing there.
be regular ad auctions, and let F be a distribution function. When A and B are VCG ad auctions we reduce the strategy set of each bidder to the set of participation strategies by assuming that the bidding strategies are the truth-telling strategies. In general, we replace this assumption with the following one: A strategy for a bidder is a pair (q, d) in which d A is a symmetric equilibrium strategy in A(q A ), which is increasing almost everywhere with respect to the probability induced by F q A and d B is a symmetric equilibrium strategy in B(q B ), which is increasing almost everywhere with respect to the probability induced by F q B ; Note that because the bidding strategies are increasing, the expected click rate functions in H(A, B, F ) are precisely the expected click rate functions, Q A , Q B defined at (8) and (9). Moreover, Proposition 4.1 continues to hold with the same proof. 8 Therefore, the following theorem holds:
Theorem 6.1 Theorems 3.3 and 3.5 are valid for regular ad auctions.
The question of which auctions are regular is not dealt with in this paper. However we conjecture that the first-price and next-price ad auctions are indeed regular. In order to prove such results it is recommended to consult (Lahaie, 2006) , where the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric equilibrium is proved for a first-price ad auction with a standard distribution function, F , but not for F q , as well as (Lebrun, 2006) , where equilibrium in first-price auctions (which can be associated with ad auctions with a single position) are discussed for general distribution functions.
Reserve Prices
In this section we extend our study to the context of ad auctions with reserve prices.
Every ad auction may have a reserve price r, 0 ≤ r < 1, which is modeled as follows:
The allocation rule allocates the non-dummy positions only to the bidders whose bid is at least r, and all other bidders receive the dummy position; A bidder's payment is calculated as if all other bidders whose bid is less than r bid r. An auction G(k, α, p) with a reserve price r is denoted by G(r, k, α, p). Obviously, G(0, k, α, p) is equivalent to G(k, α, p). The competition game with two ad auctions A,B with reserve prices r A and r B respectively, and with a distribution function F is denoted by H(r A , r B , A, B, F ). The definition of essential uniqueness of symmetric equilibrium is naturally changed: The game H(r A , r B , A, B, F ) possesses an essentially unique symmetric equilibrium if it possesses a symmetric equilibrium and for every two symmetric equilibria q,q
The structure of symmetric equilibrium in H(r A , r B , A, B, F ) is described by an additional cutting point denoted by w * .
be VCG ad auctions, let 0 ≤ r A , r B < 1, and let F be a standard distribution function.
The game H(r A , r B , A, B, F ) possesses an essentially unique symmetric equilibrium.
Moreover, If α 1 ≥ β 1 there exist a unique pair of cutting points, 0 ≤ v * ≤ 1, max{r A , r B } ≤ w * ≤ 1 for which there exists a symmetric equilibrium, q = (q A , q B ) with the following properties:
If r A ≤ r B :
If r B < r A :
Furthermore, v * = 0 if and only if α n ≥ β 1 , v * = 1 if and only if α 1 = β 1 , and w * = max{r A , r B } if and only if r A = r B .
Theorem 7.1 is proved in Subsection 7.1.
Note that in the case in which α 1 > β 1 , α n < β 1 and r A < r B , the new parameter w * satisfies r B < w * , and a bidder with a valuation between r B and w * participates in A with probability 1. Hence, bidders with low valuations above the maximal reserve price and bidders with high valuations participate in A. Only bidders with interim size of valuations randomize. Such a phenomenon cannot happen when r A = r B , and in particular it cannot happen when both auctions do not have reserve prices. A typical structure of the equilibrium for the case in which r A < r B is illustrated in Figure 3 .
Regarding revenue, Theorem 3.5 is extended as follows:
be VCG ad auctions, and let F be a standard distribution function. If r A ≤ r B and A is stronger than B, the expected revenue in A is greater than the expected revenue in B in the essentially unique symmetric equilibrium of the game H(r A , r B , A, B, F ).
The proof of Theorem 7.2 is given in Subsection 7.2.
Note one conclusion of Theorem 7.2: When the stronger auction sets a non strategic reserve price 0, even if the weaker auction sets an optimal reserve price, its expected revenue will be less than the one in A, that is, click rates are more influential for revenue than reserve prices; If auction B's organizer wishes to have a higher revenue than the one in A, she must improve her performance and provide better click rates.
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The proofs of the theorems in this section combine extensions of the techniques in previous sections with extensions of techniques established in (Burguet and Sakovics, 1999) .
A very interesting question to ask is what reserve prices will the machanism designers would choose if they could do so? Unfortunately, there is no sub-game perfect equilibrium (when sellers cannot use mixed strategies) in such a setting as mentioned in the introduction.
Proof of Theorem 7.1
The definitions, theorems and proofs in Subsection 4.1 are valid for the setup with reserve prices with the following modifications: At the presence of reservation prices the formulas for the expected click rate functions are as follows:
Equalities (i) and (ii) in (15) continue to hold for v ≥ r A and v ≥ r B respectively, and
Finally, in part 3 in Lemma 4.5 one should require that the inequality holds for every
We proceed with the proof of the theorem assuming r A ≤ r B . The proof for the other case is very similar and therefore it is omitted.
Existence
Define a family of strategiesq w = (q 
where the function h is the unique function on [0, v * ] established in Proposition 4.4. Note thatq 0 coincides with the symmetric equilibrium,q of the game H(A, B, F ), except for at most three points. Moreover, by similar arguments to those applied in Subsection 4.2, for
We argue thatq w * is a symmetric equilibrium. To show this, it suffices to prove the following three claims:
Therefore, the proofs for (a) and (b) are established by using similar arguments to those used at the analogous proofs in Subsection 4.2. We proceed to prove (c).
If w * = r B , then since U B (r B ,q w * ) = 0 we are done. Therefore, we assume that r B < w * .
We distinguish two cases.
Case 1:
and by (a) and the continuity of
We are about to prove that
However, in latter proofs we will need a stronger result, which is proved at the next lemma.
Proof:
Sinceq B w (v) = 0 for every r B < v < w, ϕ(v,q w ) = ϕ(w,q w ) for every such v.
We consider the following two cases:
By (40) Q B (w,q w ) = Q A (w,q w ). Therefore, together with (46) and (47) the result follows.
Moreover, by (46) we have that
By (48) and (49) it remains to show that
By (40) we have that
which implies that inequality (50) holds.
We proceed with the main proof. By (43), (45), and Proposition 4.1, if contradicting (44) . Therefore (c) follows for the case w * ≤ v * .
Case 2:
In addition, by Lemma 7.3,
By Proposition 4.1 for every L ∈ {A, B} and for every r 
completes the proof of part (c).
Uniqueness
We prove thatq w * is essentially unique. Let q be a symmetric equilibrium. As in the uniqueness proof for the case with no reserve prices given in Subsection 4.3, it suffices to
We will use the following Lemma, whose proof is clear and therefore omitted.
We deal first with the simple case in which r B ≥ v * . By (41) w * ≥ r B and therefore
Hence, we need to show only the two strict inequalities in (53). By Lemma 7.4,
Therefore, it is enough to show that
By Lemma 7.4,
Therefore, (54) follows from Proposition 4.1.
Henceforth, we assume that r B < v * . Lemma 4.7, which plays a key role in the proof of uniqueness for the case r A = r B = 0 should be slightly modified. The proof of the modified lemma mimics the proof of the original lemma, and therefore it is omitted:
Lemma 7.5 Let r A ≤ c < d ≤ 1 be two valuations for which U A (c, q) − U B (c, q) = 0 and
By similar arguments to the case with no reserve prices and by (55), we have Therefore, to complete the proof, it remains to show that if w * < v * , t = w * . Suppose in negation that w * < v * and t > w * . We prove that
Sinceq B t (w * ) = 0 andq t is a symmetric equilibrium, (56) implies the desired contradiction. 
Proof of Theorem 7.2
that A is stronger than B, and let F be a standard distribution function. Let R A ,R B be the expected revenues in auction A and B respectively at the essentially unique symmetric equilibrium,q w * of H(r A , r B , A, B, F ). We have to prove that
We distinguish two cases. Case 1: w * ≥ v * . In this case, for every v ≥ r B except for at most two values,q
Case 2: w * < v * . Whenever a strategy is omitted from the description of functions we assume it to be the strategyq w * . By Theorem 7.1 and (7),
w * (v) = 0 for every r A < v < w * and for every v * < v ≤ 1. Therefore,
where ∆ =
. The proof continues similarly to the proof of Theorem 3.5 to the point in which
where in this case
As in the proof of Theorem 3.5, Q x (v) > 0 for every r A < v < v * . It remains to show that G(x) < 0 for every r A < x < v * , which is equivalent to proving that
We showed in the proof of Theorem 3.5 that with no reserve prices ϕ(v,q) < Let A = G(k, α, p, F) be the standard VCG ad auction. Denote by R A = R(k, α, p, F) the expected revenue realized by the seller in A calculated under the assumption that every bidder uses the truth-telling strategy.
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In this section we address the natural question:
Do more clicks or/and more positions yield more revenue?
10 See Section 6. 11 Recall that truth telling is a weakly dominant strategy for every bidder.
Letṽ (t) be the t th reverse-order statistics generated by the random variablesṽ 1 , . . . ,ṽ n . In particular,ṽ (1) ≥ṽ (2) ≥ . . . ≥ṽ (n) .ṽ (t) is identically zero for t > n. By (2), the expected total payment realized in position l equals
where E[·] is the expectation operator with respect to the joint distribution of profiles of valuations. Therefore,
implying that
Hence, by (62), increasing all click rates by a positive multiplicative constant increases revenue by the same multiplicative constant. However, as is shown in the next theorem, if the click rates change in a non-linear way, the influence on the revenue is not necessarily positive.
Theorem 8.1 Let A = G(k, α, p, F) be the standard VCG ad auction with an arbitrary vector of distribution functions.
1. The revenue, R(k, α, p, F) = R(k, (α 1 , α 2 , . . . , α k ), p, F), is non-decreasing in α 1 ; It is increasing in α 1 if and only if E[ṽ (2) ] > 0.
2. For every position j, 2 ≤ j ≤ k, The revenue, R(k, (α 1 , α 2 , . . . , α k ), p, F), can be non-decreasing or non-increasing in α j .
Proof: By (62)
which proves the theorem.
So, increasing the click rate of position 1 increases revenue. However, the influence of incresing/decreasing other positions' click rates on the revenue depends on the distribution of valuations. To complete the answer to question (60), note that adding a position is equivalent to increasing the click rate in the current dummy position. Hence, the value of such a policy depends on its effects on the other click rates and on the distribution functions.
In the following example we consider a special important case.
Example 3 (Symmetric model, uniform distribution) Consider the classical model in which, n > k, r = 0 and each F i is the uniform distribution over [0, 1] . In this model,
, and therefore, for j ≥ 2, jE[ṽ (j+1) ] − (j − 1)E[ṽ (j) ] > 0 if and only if j < n + 1 2 .
Hence, if for example n = 4 and k = 3, an increase of α 3 reduces the revenue.
Although the VCG ad auction is currently not used in practice, it may be used in the future because of its compelling feature of having dominant strategies. Furthermore, it was shown by Ashlagi et al. (2008) that a reliable mediator can transform the next-price ad auction, which is used in practice to a VCG ad auction, which makes the analysis of the VCG auction relevant. Moreover, Varian (2007) and Edelman et al. (2007) showed that with complete information, the VCG outcome is obtained in an equilibrium of the next-price ad auction. In addition, it was proved in (Edelman et al., 2007 ) that this equilibrium is locally envy-free, and in (Varian, 2007) it is claimed that this equilibrium is consistent with the empirical data. Hence, as we show in the next example, results about the revenue in the VCG auction can be used for existing systems.
Example 4 (Next-price auctions with complete information) In existing systems, auctions' organizers run variants of the next-price ad auction. This auction has the welfare maximizer allocation rule and its payment scheme is given in (1). In a model with complete information bidder i has a commonly known valuation v i , and without loss of generality it is assumed that v 1 > v 2 > · · · > v n > 0, n > k.
Varian (2007) and Edelman et al. (2007) proved that in this game there exist multiple Nash equilibria, and that one of these equilibria generates the VCG outcome. In addition, it was empirically claimed by Varian (2007) that in practice the equilibrium that generates the VCG outcome is likely to be played. Hence, the revenue of the organizer is the same revenue as obtained in a VCG ad auction. The VCG ad auction with complete information is a special case of our study, in which the distribution F i gives probability 1 to v i . As in this case E[ṽ j+1 ] = v j+1 , the revenue in the next-price ad auction is given by the following formula:
Formula (64) enables one to determine the effects on the revenue of changing the click rates and/or adding/removing positions. As one can see the revenue can be either increasing or decreasing with the click-rates as determined by the above equation.
The implications of our findings for a search engine are as follows: a search engine should take into consideration the characteristics of the positions in the search results, as these can change the click rates and improve revenue. Moreover, by attracting advertisers and optimizing the mechanism it may be possible for an ad auction to outperform the revenue of a stronger ad auction with higher click-rates.
